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The toolish hand illusion: 
embodiment of a tool based 
on similarity with the hand
Lucilla Cardinali1*, Alessandro Zanini 2,3, Russell Yanofsky1, Alice C. Roy4,5, 
Frédérique de Vignemont6, Jody C. Culham 7 & Alessandro Farnè 2,3,8,9
A tool can function as a body part yet not feel like one: Putting down a fork after dinner does not feel 
like losing a hand. However, studies show fake body-parts are embodied and experienced as parts of 
oneself. Typically, embodiment illusions have only been reported when the fake body-part visually 
resembles the real one. Here we reveal that participants can experience an illusion that a mechanical 
grabber, which looks scarcely like a hand, is part of their body. We found changes in three signatures 
of embodiment: the real hand’s perceived location, the feeling that the grabber belonged to the body, 
and autonomic responses to visible threats to the grabber. These findings show that artificial objects 
can become embodied even though they bear little visual resemblance to the hand.
Our body is the means through which we interact with the external world. Little would a brain achieve without 
a body to execute its commands and collect information about the environment through the sensory channels. 
Yet our body is not just any kind of input/output machine that executes actions and provides feedback. We 
have a “very special regard for just one body”, such that each seems to “think of it as unique and perhaps more 
important than any other”1 We are not simply aware of one body; we are aware of it as being our own body (i.e. 
we have a sense of bodily ownership)2.
Throughout evolution, interactions with the environment have become more and more complex and medi-
ated by objects that humans built and used to overcome the limitations of their bodies. Tools expand motor 
capabilities and allow actions that would otherwise be dangerous or impossible. There is now little doubt that 
tools can be incorporated: many of their properties are processed in the same way as the properties of one’s 
 limbs3–5. But bodily ownership is that and  more6. It requires experiencing tools as constitutive parts of one’s own 
body. Though we manipulate dozens of tools during the day, could we actually feel that a fork, a toothbrush or 
a screwdriver belong to us in the same way our hands do? Here we investigate whether a tool can be processed 
as a body part not only at the spatial level (localization), but also at the physiological level (response to threats), 
and at the phenomenological level (feeling of ownership). For each measure, we assess the additional impact of 
motor experience with the tool.
Previous studies show that even ten minutes of tool-use can deeply modify the representations of both 
the body and the space around  it7–15. For example, when using a long grabber tool to retrieve objects, the arm 
representation is updated to reflect the functional elongation of the effector. Similarly, when using pliers, digit 
representations change to take into account the new morphology. Tool use also modifies the visual properties of 
peripersonal space, recoding far space as  nearer12,16,17, and enhancing the defensive monitoring of such  space18. 
However, while these previous studies showed that tool use affects sensorimotor and spatial representations, 
they did not address whether it affects body ownership, that is, whether using a tool makes it feel more like a 
part of one’s own body.
Although we seem to have little doubt about the boundaries of our own body, it has been shown that it is 
relatively easy to induce the illusion of owning external fake body parts. This line of research originated with the 
seminal paper by Botvinick and Cohen describing what is now known as the Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI)19. In 
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the RHI, participants are brushed on their (hidden) hand while they see a fake hand being stroked in synchrony. 
The temporal congruency between what is felt on their own hand and what is seen on the fake hand leads the 
subjects to report that the fake hand belongs to them.
Despite the ease with which such an important change in self-perception can be induced (from just a few 
seconds of brushing), the illusion arises only under certain conditions. First, the real and fake body parts must be 
synchronously brushed; introducing a delay drastically decreases the intensity of the  illusion19,20. For this reason, 
asynchronous brushing has become the gold-standard control condition, even though caution is necessary in 
interpreting significant synchronous vs. asynchronous differences (see below). Second, the fake limb must have 
a posture compatible with that of the real limb, be anatomically plausible, and appear connected to the body, 
suggesting that the illusion is not the mere result of a multisensory integration process between what is seen 
and what is felt, but is also modulated by higher-level representations of body  structure21,22. Moreover, although 
a discrepancy always exists between the position of the real and fake hands in the RHI setup, the vividness of 
the illusion decreases the further away from the body the fake hand is  placed23. Finally, and of most relevance 
here, the visual resemblance between the real hand and the other brushed object has been said to be crucial. The 
illusion can be induced using a fake hand that is not identical to the participant’s hand (e.g., using a rubber hand 
that is larger or has a different skin tone) and even to transplanted hands, prostheses, and virtual  avatars6,24–26. 
However, previous studies reported the illusion could not be induced for objects such as wooden blocks, even 
those shaped like  hands27,28. It has thus been assumed that a close visual resemblance to the body part is neces-
sary for the sense of ownership, thus preventing tools to be felt as parts of one’s  body29,30.
This claim, however, is controversial and has been addressed in both healthy and clinical populations. First, 
a sense of ownership may be reported in healthy participants for a virtual effector controlled by the  subject31 
or merely a virtual balloon changing in size and color in synchrony with the movements of the participant’s 
 hand32. Yet, more recently Kalckert and  colleagues33 showed no illusion for a static balloon. In their study, 
they compared the illusion induced for a fake hand with the one induced for a balloon, as in the original study, 
using two measures: proprioceptive drift and a questionnaire. They observed a significantly stronger illusion 
when a fake hand was brushed compared to when a balloon was, as indicated by proprioceptive drift of the real 
hand toward the fake one (vs. the balloon). They also agreed with questionnaire statements about ownership 
of the fake hand and feeling touch referred to the fake hand, with such ratings being stronger for asynchronous 
than synchronous stroking. Although the balloon condition also elicited a difference between synchronous and 
asynchronous condition in the questionnaire, the absolute ratings did not reflect a sense of embodiment even 
with synchronous brushing. That is, on a Likert scale from 3 = ‘strongly agree’ to − 3 = ‘strongly disagree’ where 
0 = neutral, scores for the balloon were never significantly higher than  zero34.
Taken together, the evidence suggests that objects that resemble the hand—but not those that do not—can 
become embodied. But what if one important factor is not visual resemblance but functional  resemblance35? 
Perhaps what matters for the sense of ownership may be what an object can do rather than what it looks like. 
Evidence from special populations suggests that functional resemblance could be a key factor. Although patients 
with severe degenerative arthritis may still perceive a visually distorted hand as their own, amputees may feel a 
cosmetic prosthesis as extraneous despite its visual similarity to a real  hand36,37. This may relate to the reasons 
why patients with somatoparaphrenia deny that their own hand belongs to them. They usually present with pro-
prioceptive deficits and the so-called ‘alien’ hand is, in most although not all cases, generally  paralyzed38: it can 
no longer either sense or do what the limb normally does. The functional criterion is in line with the hypothesis 
according to which one experiences as one’s own any part that is incorporated into the body schema, that is, into 
the sensorimotor representation of the body used for  action24.
To test whether functional similarity is sufficient for embodiment, previous studies used active paradigms 
where the illusion was induced not by synchronous brushing, but rather by synchronous movement of the par-
ticipant’s hand and an object. These  studies18,31,39 show that such versions of the illusion can induce changes in 
action-related body parameters like perception of body location or ownership of a movement (agency), but other 
aspects of the illusion such as the conscious feeling of ownership, were not present. These results confirm that 
the illusion is a multilayered phenomenon that cannot be captured in its entirety by one single task. Importantly, 
since they did not use tools, they leave unanswered the question of whether tools can be embodied before being 
incorporated (i.e., before tool-use).
Because tools occupy such a pervasive place in human life, we hypothesized that it may be possible to induce 
the illusion that a tool is part of one’s own body even though the illusion has previously failed with other visually 
dissimilar objects. We further predicted that motor experience with the functional properties of the tool would 
modulate the expression of the illusion. Moreover, given the multifaceted nature of embodiment, we designed 
a series of studies to assess the three aspects of embodiment.
First, we applied the classic RHI paradigm by brushing the index finger of the occluded right hand of partici-
pants while they were looking either at a mechanical grabber tool being brushed or a balloon (as a control object, 
Experiment 1). Then, in Experiment 2 we replicated the experiment using only the grabber tool, but introduced 
an asynchronous condition and an active period of tool use to test the role of motor experience with the tool. 
Finally, in Experiment 3, we tested whether the illusion was observable via physiological responses. We measured 
the presence of the illusion with three different tasks (Fig. 1): (1) proprioceptive drift (to determine whether 
the real hand was perceived as closer to the tool after the illusion was induced), (2) a questionnaire regarding 
the conscious sense of ownership in (Experiment 1 and 2); and (3) a measure of arousal (Skin Conductance 
Response,  SCR18,40) to a threat toward the tool in Experiment 3. Each task assesses one aspect of embodiment, 
defined as: “Embodiment: E is embodied if and only if some properties of E are processed in the same way as 
the properties of one’s body”6. In particular, one of those aspects is the conscious feeling that our body belongs 
to us (ownership), which can be assessed with questionnaires. A second aspect is the feeling that we are where 
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our body is (which we address here with the proprioceptive drift, a measure derived by the judgement of one’s 
position in space). The third aspect is the physiological correlates of embodiment, measured with SCR.
In addition, we examined whether there was a perceived relationship between the digits of the hand and the 
prongs of the tool and if it was affected by using the tool. Typically, the tactile version of the RHI is digit-specific41; 
that is, it only occurs if the same digit of the rubber and real hand are stroked. However, since the grabber tool we 
used here only has two “digits” (prongs), it is not immediately clear how these would be perceived to correspond 
to the digits of the real hand. The correspondence could be based on visuospatial matching (e.g., whether the 
digit is on the left or right) or functional equivalence (e.g., whether the digit functions like a thumb or an index 
finger). To test this, during the brushing phase of Experiment 2, half of the participants observed the tool being 
brushed on its left prong while the other half saw the tool being brushed on its right prong and induction of 
the illusion occurred twice: once at the beginning of the session and once following a short period of tool use.
Results
Experiment 1. 16 participants took part in this study (8 females, 1 left handed; age range 18–40). Partici-
pants gave written informed consent and received monetary compensation (15€).
 Proprioceptive Drift. As shown in Fig. 2 the index finger of the real hand was localized significantly closer to 
the tool after synchronous brushing; however, there was no significant effect drift toward the balloon. Specifically, 
a repeated-measures ANOVA with Object (Tool vs. Balloon) and Phase (Before vs. After Brushing) as within-sub-
jects factors revealed a significant interaction between Object and Phase (F = 8.747, p = 0.01, η2 = 0.385). Although 
there was a main effect of Phase (F = 4.740, p = 0.04, η2 = 0.253), it was driven largely by the tool condition.
Moreover, when comparing drift amplitude (finger localization pre-brushing—finger localization post-brush-
ing) against zero (i.e., testing for the instantiation of an illusion), we found a significant difference for the tool 
Figure 1.  Study summary. Experiment 1 (N = 16) aimed to assess whether embodiment for a tool can be 
induced with an RHI-like setup. As a control, we used a balloon as in Ma and Hommel, 2015. We measured 
brushing-induced proprioceptive drift of the index finger and subjective feelings of embodiment using a 
questionnaire. Experiment 2 (N = 40) tested tool embodiment in a larger sample and investigated the role of 
functional use of the tool. The same measures as in Experiment 1 were used. Experiment 3 (N = 32) investigated 
the physiological correlates of embodiment, measuring skin conductance responses after threat to the embodied 
tool.
Figure 2.  Perceived index finger position. In experiment 1, after 2 min of synchronous brushing, participants 
(N = 16) localised their index finger drifted toward the tool. The same participants did not show significant drift 
after synchronous brushing of the balloon. Error bars indicate 95% C.I.
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condition (1.2 cm; t = 2.10, p = 0.04) but not the balloon (0.6 cm; t = 1.69, p > 0.05;). Finally, 63% of participants 
experienced an illusion (as defined by drift > 0.5 cm) with the tool compared to 37% for the balloon.
Questionnaire. Data from the questionnaire were in line with results from the proprioceptive drift task and 
supported the presence of illusory embodiment for the tool, but not the balloon. Separate two-tailed t-tests 
revealed a significant difference between tool and balloon condition for four questions, concerning touch locali-
zation and ownership (Q1. “It felt as if the touch I was feeling was caused by the paintbrush touching the tool/
balloon”: t = 2.981, p = 0.01, d = 0.770; Q2. “It seemed like I was feeling the touch in the location where I saw the 
tool/balloon being touched”: t = 2.335, p = 0.03, d = 0.603; Q5. “I felt as if the tool/balloon were my hand”: t = 2.315, 
p = 0.03, d = 0.598; Q6. “I felt as if my hand began to resemble the tool/balloon in its posture: t = 2.884, p = 0.01, 
d = 0.745). For all the remaining control questions p values ranged between 0.10 and 0.80.
Experiment 2. We ran a second experiment (N = 40; 22 females, 2 left handed, age range 19–40 yo) to repli-
cate the illusion on a separate sample of participants and investigate the role of motor experience on the different 
components of the illusion.
Proprioceptive drift. As shown in Fig. 3, proprioceptive drift was strongest when the tool was stroked in 
synchrony with hand, particularly when the left prong of the tool (compared to the right) was stroked. Specifi-
cally, an analysis of variance (ANOVA) for proprioceptive drift with three factors—Timing (Synchronous vs. 
Asynchronous Brushing) * Phase (Pre- vs. Post-Tool Use) as within factors and Tool Prong (Left vs. Right) as 
between factors revealed a main effect of Timing (stronger illusion for synchronous vs. asynchronous brushing 
(F = 17.919, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.131)) as well as a significant interaction of Timing*Tool Prong (F = 4.205, p = 0.04, 
η2 = 0.031; Fig. 3). Post-hoc t tests revealed that, while both groups showed higher drift for the synchronous 
compared to the asynchronous condition, the difference was greatest when the left prong of the tool was stroked. 
No significant difference was found between the two groups (1st prong group and 2nd prong group) when they 
both received synchronous stimulation (t = − 1.50; d = − 0.24; p = 0.3).
Tool use did not significantly affect the drift, as we observed a tendency for the drift to decrease after tool use 
(Phase: F = 4.27, p = 0.07, η2 = 0.012), but only for the group who saw the tool being brushed on the first prong 
(Fig. 3).
Questionnaire. Multiple responses to the questionnaire indicated a significant degree of embodiment for 
synchronous stimulation, which was stronger than asynchronous stimulation. Specifically, we ran an ANOVA 
with Timing (Synchronous vs. Asynchronous) * Question (Q1 to Q14) * Tool Use (Before vs. After) as within 
factors and Tool Prong (First vs. Second) as between factor. We found a main effect of Timing (F = 53.015, 
p < 0.001, η2 = 0.097) showing that participants’ scores were higher (i.e. where more in agreement with a sense 
of embodiment) after synchronous stimulation. We also found a main effect of Question (F = 9.846, p < 0.001, 
η2 = 0.06) and, crucially, a significant Timing*Question interaction (F = 13.635, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.04). Post hoc 
tests revealed that six questions received higher scores in the synchronous condition compared to the asynchro-
nous condition, including the four questions that were significant in Experiment 1 (Q1. “It felt as if the touch I 
was feeling was caused by the paintbrush touching the tool”: t = 7.217, p < 0.001, d = 1.141; Q2. “It seemed as if 
I was feeling the touch in the location where I saw the tool being touched”: t = − 9.97, p < 0.001, d =− 1.58; Q3. 
“It seemed as if I the touch I was feeling originated from a location between my hand and the tool”: t = − 4.48, 
p < 0.001, d = − 0.71; Q5. “I felt as if the tool were my hand”: t = − 4.90, p < 0.001 d = − 0.77; Q6. “I felt as if my 
hand began to resemble the tool/balloon in its posture: t = 2.884, p = 0.01, d = 0.745; Q14. “I felt as if the tool 
were part of my body”: t = − 5.64, p < 0.001, d = − 0.89; all p values Bonferroni corrected; Fig. 4). Additionally, 
we compared scores from the significative questions to “0” (corresponding to a value of 5) and found that only 
Q1 and Q2 were significantly higher (respectively Q1: t = 3.34, p < 0.001, d = 0.53; Q2: t = 1.9, p < 0.04, d = 0.30) 
and only in the Synchronous condition. All other scores where not significantly different than 0 while all items 
of the Asynchronous condition scored significantly lower than 0. (all p < 0.001).
Figure 3.  In Experiment 2, participants (N = 40) perceived their index finger drifted toward the tool only after 
synchronous (upper panel), but not after asynchronous (lower panel), brushing. Error bars indicate 95% C.I.
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Experiment 3. Experiment 3 (N = 32, 16 females, age range: 18–30 yo) was conducted to test whether pro-
prioceptive drift and tool ownership responses reported above were also accompanied by physiological reactions 
that would support the idea of the tool being embodied. We recorded SCR while threatening the tool with a 
syringe after one minute of synchronous or asynchronous brushing. We found that participants showed a higher 
SCR after synchronous brushing of the hand and the tool compared to asynchronous brushing (0.25 vs. 0.04 µS; 
Fig. 5). However, we did not find any significant effect of experience with the tool, as the SCR did not change 
after tool use. Note that while the tool is threatened, the real hand is occluded by a wooden board and is 17 cm 
away from the tool and the syringe and thus in no ‘real’ danger. Moreover, the type of threat we used (the needle) 
was not actually potentially dangerous for the tool (while it could have been for the hand), which could explain 
why the SCR values we observed are smaller than in previous  studies42.
Conclusions
Here we report the first demonstration that it is possible to induce an illusory sense of ownership over a non-
biological object, namely a mechanical grabber tool, that shares functional but not visual similarity with the hand. 
Indeed, across three experiments, synchronous brushing of the tool and the real hand induced naive participants 
to demonstrate that three well-established signatures of the rubber-hand illusion also occur for a tool. Specifi-
cally, induction of the illusion with synchronous stroking induced participants to: (1) localize their hand closer 
to where the tool was; (2) consciously report having had the experience of the tool being their hand as well as of 
to feel touches as coming from the tool location; and (3) show increased arousal when the tool was threatened, 
Figure 4.  In Experiment 2, participants (N = 40) showed higher agreement for statement regarding changes in 
perceived touch location (Q1, Q2 and Q3 – light blue bars) and tool embodiment (Q5, Q6 and Q14 – yellow 
bars) after synchronous stimulation only. Error bars indicate 95% C. I.
Figure 5.  In Experiment 3, participants (N = 32) showed a Galvanic Skin Response to the threat of the tool after 
it was brushed synchronously, but not asynchronously, with their own index finger. Error bars indicate 95% C.I.
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even though their own hand was in no danger whatsoever. Moreover, ownership was not present for a control 
object, a balloon, that shares neither visual nor functional similarity with the hand. Taken together, these results 
support our hypothesis that functional similarity can enable ownership over external objects for which there is 
no visual similarity to a hand. This result may have important implications for development of prostheses and/or 
wearable technologies. Although the full embodiment of augmentative technology is still highly  problematic36,37, 
our data suggest that factors other than active use may favor it.
Importantly, at odds with previous work, here we found that motor experience with the tool was not neces-
sary to experience the illusion. Previous work converged in showing that tools need to be used actively to reveal 
behavioral effects of tool incorporation. Specifically, several studies reported changes in arm representation 
only in the active tool use – when sensory feedback, mainly proprioceptive and tactile, is  provided43–45—but 
not during passive holding of the tool. Interestingly, the proprioceptive information doesn’t necessarily need to 
arise from the tested arm. Miller and  colleagues10, using a mirror-based setup to induce the illusory experience 
of controlling the tool with the left arm, showed that the representation of the left arm length was modified 
after active use of the tool with the right arm. Moreover, tactile recalibration was not found when the tool was 
only passively held by the right hand (no somato-motor feedback) or when the mirror was removed (no visual 
feedback). Taken together, these data suggest that when it comes to tools, the criteria for integration of sensory 
feedback is relatively broad and allows some discrepancies: Somato-motor information from the right arm and 
visual information attributed to the left arm can be combined, to update both arm representations. Perhaps the 
tolerance for such discrepancies also enables tool embodiment despite the gap between the real hand position 
and the distal end of the tool, between where the sensory receptors physically are on the skin and the tool loca-
tion where sensory feedback about a movement propagates from. One could then speculate that the sensory 
information coming from the participants’ hand is being combined with the visual information from the touched 
tool, without the need of actual tool use.
Actually, here tool-use did not seem to play a major role in either establishing or modulating the illusion, 
which was already present before tool-use and not significantly impacted afterwards. That said, we did observe a 
trend: participants who looked at the tool being brushed on the first prong tended to reduce their drift after tool 
use, as if the second prong of the tool becomes functionally similar to the right index finger (which would be in 
a similar position during real-hand grasping). While further studies are needed, here we advance the possibility 
that two, non-mutually exclusive kinds of matching may exist between tool prongs and hand fingers (visual and 
functional), which might be modulated following tool use.
Taken together, these findings provide evidence for a new illusion, which we have named the “Toolish Hand 
Illusion”. This illusion reveals that a tool can be perceived as an owned body part, as jointly supported by three 
different measures, and thus different cognitive levels, of the feeling of ownership. While the present study cannot 
disentangle their relative weight, we suggest the Toolish Hand Illusion may not rely solely on sensory factors, 
such as visual similarity, but also on motor factors, such as the potential for action. To date, our findings already 
show that when both are removed, as in the case of the balloon condition, no ownership is observed. Our results 
also indicate a novel avenue for further research on the constraints of illusory body ownership, since the way 
the parts of a tool are mapped onto the actual parts of the body could be modulated by the experience and the 
perceived functionality of the tool.
Methods
In total, 88 adult students (age range: 18–40) from Western University and Impact Lab at the Lyon Neuroscience 
Research Centre participated in the study (Experiment 1: N = 16, 8 females, 1 left handed; Experiment 2: N = 40, 
22 females, 2 left handed, Experiment 3: N = 32, 16 females, all right handed). The number of participants to be 
tested was based on previous  literature31 that addressed the question of embodiment on non-corporeal objects. 
Moreover, for each experiment we run a post hoc power analysis using G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner and 
Lang, 2009) to check that our sample size was large enough to obtain a 0.80 power, given the effect size for the dif-
ferent tasks. For all three experiments, the power to detect the main effect of the stimulation was higher than 0.99.
Participants received monetary compensation ($10 for those recruited at Western University, 15€ for those 
recruited at CRNL). All had normal or corrected-to-normal vision and no history of neurological or psychiatric 
disorders and had never used the grabber before. Participants were naïve about the specific goal of the study 
and were fully debriefed after. All participants provided informed consent and the experiment was approved 
by the Psychology Ethics Board of Western University (#130319) and the French (CPP SUD EST IV #11/005) 
ethics committee and was conducted in accordance with the ethical guidelines presented in the revised Helsinki 
 declaration46.
Experiment 1: Tool Embodiment and role of functional similarity. The first experiment assessed 
whether it was possible to induce a RHI-like illusion with a grabber tool, in place of the hand, and tested the role 
of functional similarity between the hand and the object in driving embodiment. The grabber tool used, used in 
all experiments, was a mechanical grabber tool (Unger-Global, Unger Global NN400—Nifty Nabber Pro; http://
www.unger globa l.com/en/), 52  cm long in total, composed of two rubber prongs that closed symmetrically 
when the participant used a power grip to squeeze the handle of the tool and a 12-cm long handle. No tool use 
occurred in Experiment 1.
Participants were comfortably seated at a table with their right hand and arm on the table, hidden from sight 
under a semi-reflecting mirror. The right hand was kept in a relaxed position with right thumb close to the rest 
of the hand and not protruding to the side. To further reduce cues about the participant’s arm position, a large 
piece of black fabric was used to cover the shoulder and both upper arms. Participants were instructed to keep 
their left hand on their left leg.
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The experiment started with a finger localization task: a ruler was placed face down over of the mirror; par-
ticipants were asked to report the number on a ruler (with mm precision), corresponding to the position of their 
right index finger. We instructed participants to close their eyes and realign their head to the center of the body 
in between trials while the experimenter changed the offset of the ruler. The measure was repeated 12 times. 
Once the task completed and depending on the condition, a grabber tool or a black balloon were placed on the 
table 17 cm to the left of the participants’ right hand. The experimenter then started brushing the object on the 
table and the right index finger for two minutes. For the tool we brushed the left tool prong. For the balloon, 
which was inflated so that its width would match the one of the tool prongs, we brushed the portion of its surface 
that corresponded to where the left prong would be. Once the brushing completed, participants were asked to 
close their eyes again while the object was removed and the ruler put in place to restart the finger localization 
task (12 trials). The difference between finger localization measured before and after the brushing phase, called 
‘Proprioceptive Drift”, was used to quantify the illusion.
Finally, participants received a questionnaire to assess their subjective experience during the illusion induc-
tion. The questionnaire was composed by 14 statements (see Supplemental Table 1 for a complete list) addressing 
several aspects of the illusion experience, namely “Embodiment” (Q4, Q5, Q14), “Touch Localization” (Q1, Q2, 
Q3); “Disembodiment of the own hand” (Q8, Q9, Q11) and “Control Questions” (Q6 and Q7). Participants were 
asked to rate their agreement with each statement marking a point on a line oriented from left (I don’t agree at 
all) to right (I completely agree).
Each participant was tested twice (once with synchronous stimulation and the other time with asynchronous 
stimulation) and the order of the conditions was counterbalanced across the subjects. Data from one participant 
were discarded as he did not complete the second session.
Experiment 2: Tool Embodiment and role of motor experience. The experiment consisted of three 
phases: pre tool-use, tool-use and post tool-use. In each of the pre- and post-tool-use phases, the position of the 
right index finger was localized before and after illusion induction to assess proprioceptive drift and a question-
naire was administered to assess subjective experience. In the tool-use phase, participants got experience using 
the tool to grasp and lift objects.
Participants were seated with their right forearm resting on a table. The mechanical grabber tool was placed 
17 cm to the left of the participant’s right hand such that the shaft was parallel to the participant’s forearm and 
the tip of the “business end” was at the same distance as the digit tips of the hand. Throughout the experiment, 
a small board (25 × 45 × 15 cm) occluded the right forearm from the participant’s view. To further reduce cues 
about the participant’s arm position, a large piece of black fabric was used to cover the shoulder and both upper 
arms. Participants were instructed to keep their left hand on their left leg.
During measurement of proprioceptive drift, a bigger board (100 × 55 × 20 cm) covered both the smaller board 
and the tool. Participants were asked to judge the felt position of their right fingertip by naming a number on a 
measuring stick (with mm precision) placed atop the big board above their right hand. The task was repeated 
six times and the origin of the measuring stick was changed in between trials to prevent judgments from being 
influenced by previous answers. Proprioceptive localization was measured both prior to and following induc-
tion of the illusion and the difference between them, ‘Proprioceptive Drift”, was used to quantify the illusion.
Following the measurement of proprioceptive drift, participants filled out a questionnaire: two statements 
focused on touch location (“It seemed like I was feeling the touch in the location where I saw the tool being 
touched” and “It seemed like the touch I felt was caused by the paintbrush touching the tool”), one focused on 
the conscious experience of the tool being one’s own hand (“I felt as if the tool were my hand”) and two served 
as control questions.
During illusion induction, the participant could see the distal end of the tool (from the midpoint of the shaft 
to the tip) but not the right hand (because the large board had been removed while the smaller board remained 
in place). Participants were instructed to look at the tool while it was stroked with a paintbrush either synchro-
nously or asynchronously (depending on the session) with their own (unseen) right index finger for 2 min. They 
were also instructed to keep their right hand and forearm still.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two groups. Participants in Group 1 saw the tool being 
brushed on its left prong while participants in Groups 2 saw the right prong of the tool being brushed.
In the Tool-use Phase participants were asked to move to a different table where a plastic parallelepiped object 
(5 × 2 × 1cm) was placed 35 cm from the proximal edge of the table. On the same edge, a small colored pad served 
as starting point. Participants were asked to keep the fingers of the same mechanical grabber tool in contact 
with the colored pad and wait for an auditory instruction to start the movement (reach and grasp the object, lift, 
replace it and then return to the starting position). Forty-eight movements were performed.
Experiment 3: Skin conductance response as a measure of sense of ownership. This experi-
ment assessed an additional dependent measure of the sense of ownership: the skin conductance response to 
seeing the tool being stabbed by a needle.
Similarly to Experiment 2, Exp. 3 consisted of three phases (pre tool-use, tool-use, and post tool-use) but of 
four groups (with a factorial combination of left vs. right tool-prong and synchronous vs. asynchronous stroking). 
Skin Conductance Response (SCR) is a physiological measure of the electrical activity associated with increased 
secretions from the sweat glands resulting from sympathetic nervous system arousal. When one’s own body is 
threatened, skin conductance increases.
Participants were seated at a table in an anechoic room to reduce electrical interference and acoustic noise. 
The room was also equipped with a ventilation system that allowed to set the temperature constant (around 
21.7 °C) to avoid noise in the SCR with temperature fluctuations. Room temperature was set at the beginning of 
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each session and the experimenter checked, at the end, that no major change happened during each session. SCR 
was recorded using a Biopac System MP150 (Goleta, USA). Two electrodes were attached to the tips of the right 
index and middle fingers. Data were recorded at 100 Hz and processed with the software AcqKnowlege 4.0 for 
Windows. The right hand was then positioned palm down inside a box that was opened on the experimenter’s 
side (as well as the participant’s side) to enable brushing of the index finger. Six blocks of 60 s of brushing (syn-
chronous or asynchronous) were alternated with a threatening block during which the experimenter briefly (~ 2 s) 
stabbed one of the two fingers of the tool (depending on the group the participant belonged to) with a syringe. 
The beginning of the brushing and the threat were manually flagged in the SCR acquisition file.
First, the threat-induced SCR response was identified by selecting the highest peak in a 5 s time window after 
threat onset. Then the peak-to-peak amplitude of such response was calculated and averaged across the six trials.
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